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Introduction
Economists have long debated the wisdom of
various constitutional constraints on monetary
policy. Milton Friedman argued that economists
do not know enough about the complexities of
the economy to make discretionary policies that
would be better than rules, and that the attempt
to improve economic performance through dis-
cretionary policies has led to consequences
worse than those that would have resulted from
rules.
1 Another, entirely different, argument in
favor of rules comes from the time-consistency
literature: Rules affect expectations, and commit-
ting in advance to a policy rule (typically of a
state-contingent nature) leads to better out-
comes than can be obtained with optimal discre-
tionary actions.
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Opponents of rules typically focus on the
complexity of optimal state-contingent rules, ar-
guing that these complex rules might be better
approximated by discretionary policy actions
• 1 See Friedman (1959).
• 2 See Kydland and Prescott (1977) for an original statement of the
time-consistency problem.
than by simple rules that could be written and
enforced at reasonable cost.
3
One implication of the time-consistency lit-
erature is that institutions and rules might be
used to improve an economy's inflation perform-
ance without sacrificing output. Some of our cur-
rent monetary institutions have been rationalized
as attempts to achieve a lower inflation outcome
than occurs in a world in which the optimal
short-run policy is not time-consistent. One
institution that has lowered inflation is the inde-
pendent central bank.
4 Another is the practice
of appointing conservative central bankers.
5
In this paper, we show that a rule for the price
level may dominate a rule for the inflation rate,
even in the case where, for purely economic
reasons, an inflation rule is preferred. In our
model, policymakers do not have perfect con-
trol over inflation, some policymakers have a
preference for more inflation than is socially
desirable, and the penalty for breaking the rules
• 3 See Summers (1988) for three arguments against rules.
• 4 See Bade and Parkin (1987) and results summarized in Alesina
(1988), table 9 on page 41.
• 5 See Rogoff (1985).is not overly severe. Under these conditions, an
inflation rule will lead some policymakers to
attribute policy-induced inflation to nonpolicy
causes. Because nonpolicy shocks to the infla-
tion rate can occur in any time period, a severe
penalty is not optimal.
Under a price-level rule, the source of the in-
flation in any time period does not matter. The
penalty associated with this rule provides an
incentive for policymakers to offset inflation,
regardless of the source. A price-level target con-
strains the current behavior of policymakers
because today's choices directly affect tomor-
row's options.
I. Stable Prices vs.
Zero Inflation
We present a simple example of inflation and
monetary policy in which two types of policy-
makers might be in charge of monetary policy.
These two types want different levels of infla-
tion. They differ because inflation has two
effects: 1) a negative effect on overall social wel-
fare and 2) uninsurable redistributive effects
that benefit some people at the expense of
others. We assume one type of potential
policymaker receives private gains from infla-
tion that may dominate his share of the overall
social loss. The other type loses more than the
aggregate social loss from inflation. We do not
model the reasons for the lack of insurability of
these redistributive consequences of inflation;
our model simply assumes there are limits on in-
surance or financial markets that prevent such
insurance from operating perfectly.
We assume that while inflation is observable,
the behavior of policymakers is not—people
observe and understand inflation, but not the
monetary policy that affected it. Monetary
policy cannot be perfectly inferred from either
inflation or monetary growth because random
factors, such as shifts in output supply and the
demand for money, also affect these variables.
We interpret rules as penalties (or rewards)
for policymakers based on observed outcomes
of inflation: They are features of the overall com-
pensation package of policymakers. This pack-
age could include implicit as well as explicit
payments, and deferred as well as current pay-
ments (in such forms as fame, praise by the
news media, and opportunities to give speeches
and write books, or to take various desirable
positions after the policymaker's term of office
expires).
If there were no limits on the penalties that
could be imposed on policymakers, a rule
could specify an extreme penalty for policy-
makers whenever inflation deviates from zero
by some threshold amount. Then any policy-
maker would try to achieve zero inflation. But
the random forces affecting inflation would
sometimes make it exceed that threshold, so the
penalty would sometimes apply. To induce any-
one to be a policymaker, the salary would have
to compensate for the risk of high inflation due
to random events and the subsequent penalty.
With risk-averse individuals, the required salary
would have to be very high to compensate for
the risk of a severe penalty.
Thus, an optimal reward structure for policy-
makers involves a limited penalty for deviating
from target inflation and a correspondingly
smaller expected reward. We do not model the
incentives to enforce the rule; we simply assume
that constitutional rules are enforceable and are
actually enforced.
For simplicity, we assume the socially op-
timal inflation rate is zero (though the optimal
inflation rate is immaterial to our argument).
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We compare two policy rules (compensation
packages for policymakers)—one that penalizes
policymakers whenever inflation deviates from
the socially optimal rate (zero), and another that
penalizes them whenever prices deviate from a
stable level.
We believe that a stable price level is a better
goal for monetary policy than a zero-inflation
goal that allows drift in the price level. A stable
price policy eliminates inflation and the asso-
ciated uncertainty that interferes with efficient
long-term nominal contracting and borrowing.
To avoid biasing our results in favor of the
price-level rule, however, we ignore these argu-
ments for a stable price level. Instead, we assume
that society gains from a zero rate of inflation
(even if this means price-level drift). The stable-
price-level rule requires inflation or deflation to
correct for past changes in the price level.
Although this inflation or deflation causes a
social loss when it occurs, the stable-price rule
can generate a socially better outcome because
it alters the incentives of policymakers.
• 6 We have argued elsewhere for zero inflation (see Gavin and
Stockman [1988]). Our arguments there suggest that policymakers
should stabilize the price level rather than its rate ot change. In our cur-
rent example, we assume that the socially optimal policy is designed to
achieve a zero rate of change of prices.II. A Simple Model
We examine a simple two-period model in
which inflation, n , results from a monetary
policy variable, m, and an exogenous random
disturbance, e -.
(1) = m+ e.
We assume E(e) = 0 and is observed only after
m is chosen. This random disturbance may be
thought of as a combination of shocks to output
supply, shifts in money demand, and errors in
monetary control. This random component
prevents people from observing policy actions
directly.
Inflation is socially costly. We assume there
is a social loss from inflation z (71), where
(2) = ZK
2,z>0.
The population of the economy is fixed and nor-
malized at two. The social cost of inflation is
divided equally among all households, so each
bears one-half of this social cost.
There are two types of households in the
economy—type-i households, who privately
benefit from inflation at the level 71* > 0, and
type-0 households, who privately lose from non-
zero inflation. The population of each type is
normalized at one.
The purely private component of the loss to




The total loss each period to each type-0
household is the sum of the two losses, Z (jt)/2
+ HiTti.
The purely private component of the loss to
each type-i household is G in), where
(4) = (g/2)(n-n*)
2,g>0.
The total loss each period to each type-i
household is Z(n)/2 + Gin).
In our example, as inflation rises from zero
to jr.*, some households gain at the expense of
others. In addition to this redistribution, infla-
tion has a social cost of Z(TC).
The monetary policy variable, m, is con-
trolled by a central bank that may be captured
by either group. We do not model this capture
here, as it is largely immaterial for our argument.
The outcome of this process is a random vari-
able. We assume that the same policymaker is
in charge for both periods.
We consider two alternative rules for mone-
tary policy. Each rule is a set of penalties to the
group in charge of policy, for deviating from
some target inflation outcome. We assume these
rules can be perfectly enforced. Section III con-
siders a rule for zero inflation—one that does
not penalize the policymaker for failing to cor-
rect past changes in the price level. Section IV
then considers a rule for a stable price level—a
zero-inflation rule that penalizes policymakers





Consider a rule for zero inflation that does not
penalize a policymaker for failing to correct
past changes in prices. The rule consists of a
penalty (smaller total compensation) for infla-
tion. We assume it takes the form
(5) k>0.
We do not derive the optimal penalty in this
paper. To do so would require the explicit spec-
ification of the relationship between the cost of
compensating policymakers and the level of the
penalty. The optimal penalty would be chosen so
that the marginal benefit from a lower inflation
trend associated with a higher penalty would just
offset the increased compensation required by the
policymaker at the higher penalty rate.
Type-0 Policymakers
If a type-0 individual controls policy, his prob-
lem in the second period it = 2) is to choose m
to minimize
subject to (1). Let q = z + k. The type-0
policymaker minimizes
h+ q
which implies that he chooses m = 0. His mini-
mized expected loss is then
b+ q
E(e
2).The optimization problem of a type-0 policy-




where (3 is a discount factor and e2 denotes the
second-period realization of the random distur-
bance e. This obviously has the same solution
as at t= 2, namely m = 0. A type-0 policymaker
subject to this rule would choose monetary
policy that results in zero expected inflation
each period.
Type-i Policymakers
We now turn to the optimization problem of a







The minimized expected loss of the type-i
policymaker at t = 2 is
The policy rule for zero expected inflation
results in positive expected inflation if a type-i
policymaker is in charge because he balances
the penalty for higher inflation against his
private gains from inflation. The limitations on
penalties discussed earlier prevent the penalty
from being so large that this policymaker would
set m = 0.
IV. A Stable-Price
Zero-Inflation Rule
We now turn to a stable-price rule, which in-
vokes a penalty in the second period if inflation
deviates from a level that would return the price
level to its original position in the first period.
We assume the penalty at t = 2 raises the per-
household cost of inflation, to the households
in charge of policy, from K(n) to K(n - n
T),
where n
T is the target inflation specified by
the rule. This target inflation is, in our setup,
simply the negative of actual inflation at t =1:
n
T= —7tj = — (ml + e1), where ml is the first-
period money growth rate and ex is the first-
period exogenous disturbance. This implies
7t
7')= k(m+ e+ m1 + e1)
2.
(8) E{ -i)rf* + e]
Type-0 Policymakers
A type-0 policymaker at t = 2 chooses m to
minimize
q
+ — (\in* + e)
2).
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= b + z+k(i i) K i )
The policymaker weighs the costs of non-
zero inflation against the costs of deviating from
the rule. He then chooses money growth to at-
tempt to reverse a fraction r of the previous
period's inflation. His minimized expected loss




This is the same monetary growth rate as in the
second period. So, a type-i policymaker
chooses a time-invariant money growth rate
that yields positive expected inflation.
(11)Now consider the incentives of this policy-




• - [ [i n* -
-I
2
- r) {mx + ex)+ e]
2}
In the first period, a type-i policymaker
knows that positive inflation will be costly in
the second period and chooses m to minimize
This implies that w, = 0 in the first period and
that the second-period policy simplifies to m =
— rev So a type-0 policymaker would choose
the policy m = 0 in the first period. In the second
period, he would choose policy to try to reverse
a fraction r of any accidental inflation in the
first period resulting from the random shock e.
- r(m+ e) + e2-n*] -n*]
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Type-i Policymakers
Finally, we turn to the behavior of a type-i
policymaker subject to the stable-price rule. In
the second period, he chooses m to minimize
So,
k) m+ G(m-n*)




















= [in* - r(ml + ex).
In period 2, the type-i policymaker chooses an
inflation rate that balances the private gain from
positive inflation against the cost of the penalty
for deviating from zero. Under the stable-price
regime, however, the cost of deviating from
zero inflation also depends on the inflation rate
in the first period. The period 2 money growth
will be modified to offset some of the period 1
inflation. The minimized expected loss of the
policymakers is, conditional on t = 1 variables,
which implies
gn*[z+g+(l-$)k]
(13) m = -
z+ g+ k- $k
= (p7l*
<|17t*.
An important feature of this solution for
money growth is that it is positive but smaller
than n, n*, the money growth rate that the
policymaker would choose in the absence of
the stable-price rule.
The solution in (13) for first-period policy im-
plies that the second-period policy choice is
(14) = [in* -
We summarize these results in table 1. The
stable-price rule has costs and benefits relative
to the rule permitting price-level drift. If type-0
households control monetary policy, they
choose zero-money-growth rates under the lat-
ter rule, but they choose money growth that at-























N.7C* - r (971* + e j)
NOTE: u., r, and ip are as defined in equations (9), (10), and (13). Recall
that <p is smaller than |X ; so the stable-price rule results in less inflation in
each period if the policymaker is type-i. This is the social benefit of a stable-
price rule. The cost of that rule is the nonzero expected inflation in the
second period that occurs if the policymaker is type-i.
SOURCE: Authors.
under the stable-price rule. This is a cost of a
stable-price rule, because it would be socially
optimal, ignoring incentives, for money growth
to be zero each period.
But the stable price level also has important
benefits. Under this rule, if a type-i person con-
trols monetary policy, he chooses lower money
growth each period. In the second period, the
stable-price rule operates directly by penalizing
him for failing to return the price level to its tar-
get level. In the first period, expectations of this
penalty lead him to choose less money growth.
Suppose the probability that the policymaker
is type-0 is p and the probability that the policy-
maker is type-i is 1 - p . Then expected inflation
under a zero-inflation rule that permits price drift
is (1 - p) \i n* each period; expected inflation
under a stable-price rule is (1 - p) 971* < (1 - p)
(0. JI* in the first period and (1 - p) (u, - r(p) 71*
- re, < (1 - p) |X TC* in the second period.
The variance of inflation under the zero-




2 each period. The variance under the stable-
price rule is p (1 - p) (p
 2 jr*
2 + a
2 in the first




second period. Since |0.xp> rep > 0, the stable-
price rule also reduces the variance of inflation.
V. Conclusion
We have presented an example in which a rule
for monetary policy specifying a stable price
level dominates a rule for zero inflation with
price-level drift. This result occurs despite our
assumptions that zero inflation—rather than a
stable price level—is socially optimal and that
policymakers cannot perfectly control inflation.
Our example thereby ignores the arguments we
have made elsewhere for a stable price level.
Nevertheless, a stable-price rule can be better
than a rule for zero inflation that permits price
drift, particularly because policy is unobserv-
able. The stable-price rule raises the penalty on a
policymaker who purposely engineers positive
inflation but falsely claims that it was the unin-
tended result of random forces. The cost of this
rule is a change in incentives of policymakers
who would act in the social interest without the
rule. But, as in our example, this cost can be
second-order, while the benefit is first-order.
In this two-period model, the policymaker
always prefers the zero-inflation rule over the
price-level rule. Well-intentioned policymakers
know that they would deliberately aim for the
social optimum without the rule. Those who
would privately gain from inflation would find
that the zero-inflation rule is less costly than the
price-level rule.
There are several artificial features of our
example. For simplicity, we assume a two-
period model. There is likely to be some infla-
tion on average over the two periods even
under a constant-price-level rule. This average
inflation converges to zero as the number of
periods increases.
We have not explained the social costs of
inflation, though we have attempted to summa-
rize them elsewhere. We have interpreted a rule
as a penalty function for failing to achieve some
goal, and we have ignored the problem of
incentives for enforcement. Nevertheless, there
may be enforceable rules that the government
can impose on the behavior of one of its agen-
cies, such as a central bank. If so, our conclu-
sion may be fairly general.
This paper has not addressed the question of
an optimal rule. But it shows why a simple
stable-price rule can dominate a simple zero-
inflation rule by reducing the policymaker's
incentive to create inflation for special interests
and blame it on random events.References
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